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ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
TOWARD A MORE UTILITARIAN

JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
Rod Smith*
In ParadiseLost, one finds a Miltonic vision of a parliamentary debate

during which the participants in Pandemonium are suddenly miniaturized.'
This scene is a fitting metaphor for Florida's current discussion over the
future direction of juvenile justice. The juvenile justice debate seemingly
shrinks all parties as they recite arguments carefully crafted to capture a
greater political audience-share from a public understandably anxious about
juvenile crime. The leadership of Florida can only avoid shrinking from or
during the debate by expanding its vision for juvenile justice.
First, consider the dimensions of Florida's juvenile justice problems. In
1997, the Florida Inter-University Consortium for Child, Family, and
Community issued an interim report on chronic juvenile offenders which
stated:
According to a report prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Florida has led the nation
in Index crimes (i.e., murder, burglary, strong-armed robbery,
aggravated assaults, motor vehicle theft) for more than a decade
(Florida Statistical Analysis Center [FSAC], 1996). In 1994, Florida

* Adapted from keynote address given by Rod Smith, State Attorney, at the Juvenile
Justice Symposium Sponsored by the University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy,
Mar. 17, 1999. Special appreciation to Kim Eckert for assisting in researching this article.
1. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, BOOK 1, lines 758-93 (Merrit Y. Hughes ed., The
Odyssey Press 1935) (1667).
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ranked second in the nation for juveniles arrested for violent crime
(FSAC, 1996). While Florida accounts for 5% of all juveniles
arrested in the United States, Florida also accounts for 25% of all
juveniles who are transferred to adult courts for felonies (Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention [OJJDP], 1995). From
1985 to 1995, the juvenile population in Florida increased by 39%,
but juvenile arrests increased at alarming rates (FSAC, 1996). In this
decade:
Juvenile arrests for murder increased by 122%
Juvenile arrests for robbery increased by 97%
Juvenile arrests for aggravated assaults increased by
109%
Juvenile arrests for motor vehicle thefts increased by
85%
The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice reports that
these alarming trends continue presently with the number of
youths referred for delinquency increasing in the last year by
30% overall, and 63% for drug involved delinquency
referrals. Over the past five years, felony marijuana cases
have increased 105%. Additionally, following a disturbing
national trend, females are one of the most rapidly growing
members of delinquency cases. In the past year white
female delinquency cases have increased by 61% and black
... female delinquency cases have increased by 45%
(Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, 1997).2

In 1995, less than five percent of the U.S. population under the age of
eighteen lived in Florida, yet this state accounted for more than fourteen
percent of violent juvenile delinquent acts.' The 1995 national rate of
violent acts per 100,000 juveniles was 136; in Florida that number was 412.4
In October 1998, Florida's Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) reported that
Florida ranked second in the nation in violent juvenile crime. 5 While some
encouragement can be taken from the fact that between 1995 and 1997 the
reported violent juvenile crime rate declined slightly, Florida still did not
improve its position relative to the performance of other states.

2. See FLORIDA INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR CHILD, FAMILY, AND COMMUNITY
STUDIES, INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY BOARD 5 (1997) [hereinafter
FLORIDA INTER-UNIVERsITY CONsORTIUM].
3. See FLORIDA DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT REPORT No. 64, VIOLENT

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A FIVE-YEAR REvIEw 1992-1993 THROUGH 1996-97, at
[hereinafter FIVE-YEAR REVIEW].

1 (1998)

4. See id.
5. See FLORIDA DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT REPORT No. 81, How Do
JUVENILE ARREST RATES IN FLORIDA COMPARE TO THOSE OF OTHER STATES? 1 (1998).
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When viewed over the long term, juvenile crime in Florida remains
among the nation's worst. Over the last five years, Florida's population of
children between the ages of 10 and 17 increased by 12%, while the number
of juveniles referred to the DJJ increased by 30%.6 Despite some recent
declines, there are several figures that portend, if unchecked, a bleak future
of increasing juvenile violence. Among violent juvenile offenders, an
increasing percentage (11.6%) were under 13 years of age.7 That number,
when combined with demographic projections of a 24% increase in the
number of Floridians between the ages of 10 and 17 by the year 2004,8
augurs a potential juvenile crime wave. The 1996 report of The Council on
Crime in America issued the following warning, which very much applies to
Florida:
[M]ake no mistake: Recent drops in serious crime are but the lull
before the coming crime storm. As this report forecasts, this storm
is gathering in the form of a demographic bulge of young, highly
crime-prone males. Between now and the year 2005 enormous
upward pressure will be exerted on crime rates. 9
Any credible measure of juvenile crime must include a review of its
financial impact on Florida taxpayers. In 1994, Florida residents lost over
$37 million to juvenile auto thefts alone. 10 During the same year, juvenile
robberies cost Florida victims $7.6 million.' No one has even attempted
to measure or monetize the amount that individuals now spend privately to
protect themselves from juvenile criminals.
In 1997, Florida's taxpayers paid nearly $600 million to operate DJJ
programs. 12 This enormous expenditure does not include the millions of
dollars paid by local school districts and law-enforcement agencies for afterschool programs, school resource officers, and constructed safety
improvements. Local expenditures for juvenile assessment centers required
additional millions of dollars.' 3 It is estimated that Floridians pay $10,000

6. See HOUSE JUSTICE COUNCIL, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
RESOURCE BOOK 48 (1998).

1998 POST-SESSION

7. See FIVE-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 3, at 7.
8. See JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY BD., FLA. LEGIS., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE FACT BOOK 45 (1997).
9. See THE COUNCIL ON CRIME IN AMERICA, THE STATE OF VIOLENT CRIME IN
AMERICA 4 (1996).
10. See FLORIDA INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM, supra note 2, at 6.
11. See id.
12. See JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY BD., 1998 OUTCOME EVALUATION REPORT, VOL.
I, at 5 (1998).
13. See FLA. S. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REP. NO. 97-P-23, JUVENILE ASSESSMENT
CENTER OPERATIONAL FUNDING 16, 17 (1997).
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annually for each juvenile delinquent under supervision. 14 Florida's
aftercare costs, which are paid for transitioning juveniles released from
commitment, increased from $2.5 million in 1990-1991 to $28.1 million in
1998-1999.15 Four years after embarking upon the most ambitious commitment facility construction plan in Florida's history, more than 882 adjudicated delinquents remain on a commitment waiting list.6 Even a
conservative cost projection for juvenile programs needed to adequately
absorb the approaching demographic bulge could easily raise Florida's annual
juvenile justice bill above the one billion dollar mark. Despite huge recent
expenditures, in light of a history of rising juvenile crime rates, an approaching "bubble" of at-risk children, and a juvenile recidivism rate
exceeding 64%,7 Floridians should require further improvement in juvenile
justice performance.
Before exploring the unfilled promise of Florida's juvenile justice system,
a condensed history of how this state got where it is might be helpful. In
1911, toward the end of a national epoch of social reform, the Florida8
legislature first designated county courts as the state's juvenile courts.'
Nonetheless, youths were still routinely referred to criminal court because the
1885 Constitution vested exclusive jurisdiction in the circuit courts for most
criminal acts. 9
In 1950, a statewide referendum overwhelmingly adopted an amendment
to Article V of the Florida Constitution that not only created juvenile courts
with exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile offenses but also defined crimes
committed by juveniles to be acts of delinquency.20 In 1951, the legislature
enacted Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, thereby creating a framework for
processing juvenile delinquents, which still remains as the basic undergirding
of Florida's juvenile law. 2' Thereafter, generations of Florida's juvenile
offenders were sentenced as delinquents to reformatories.
In 1983, as a result of the Bobby M class action lawsuit, 22 Florida's
juvenile justice system was court-ordered to make substantial improvements

14. See FLORIDA INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM, supra note 2, at 6.
15. See JUVENILE JUSTICE ACCOUNTABILITY BD., FLA. LEGIS., Doc. No. 99-001-JJAB,
1999 ANNUAL REPORT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE FACT BOOK 142 (1999).

16. See id. at 89.
17. See FLORIDA

DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT REPORT No. 63,
DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE RECIDIvISM REPORT FOR COMMITMENT PROGRAMS: FY

1995-96, at 13 (1997).
18. See generally JUVENILE JUSTICE ACCOUNTABILITY BD., supra note 15, at 46-47
(discussing the historical highlights of Florida's juvenile justice system).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Bobby M v. Chiles, 907 F. Supp. 368 (N.D. Fla. 1995).

1999]

JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM

in the way it operated juvenile facilities.23 The reason for the federal
court's order in Bobby M was a finding that Florida's juvenile facilities were
inadequate, if not inhumane. 24
In 1990, Florida's juvenile justice system was restructured to conform
with the standards set by Bobby M.25 The reforms focused on the need for
early intervention and prevention, an objective risk assessment instrument,
and greater placement capacity. 26 The 1990 reforms were too little and too
late. An upsurge in juvenile violent crime rates ensued, most of which
should have been attributed to failures in the distant past rather than to the
new reforms. At least two cases involving violent juvenile attacks upon
foreign tourists, the lifeblood of Florida's economy, shook the state's
confidence in its juvenile justice system. Reports of increasing juvenile
violence made parents concerned that their children were unsafe at school.
A politically important elder population increasingly felt trapped inside their
residences after reading or watching stories about juvenile gang violence.
Business leaders feared a loss in tourism while law enforcement was openly
frustrated by the lack of consequences for young offenders.
By the mid-1990s, a legislature recently dominated by Republicans had
committed Florida to a retributive approach to adult crime that included
expanded prison construction, increased determinate sentences, and a truth-insentencing law aimed at increasing the time criminals actually spend behind
bars. These changes were not only popular, they also demonstrably improved
adult crime rates. Responding to both a public perception that a more
retributive approach worked and a continuing law-enforcement frustration
with juvenile offenders, the 1994 legislature enacted the most sweeping
changes in Florida's juvenile law since 1951.
The 1994 Juvenile Reform Act transferred all juvenile justice programs
from the Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services (HRS), then the
state's largest social services agency, to the newly created DJJ. The
legislature immediately appropriated $440 million to increase Florida's
juvenile commitment capacity and thereby reduced the list of delinquents
awaiting placement. 27 The 1994 legislation created both nonresidential and
residential commitment programs designated on the basis of offender history
and the seriousness of the offense.28 The levels were classified as Levels

23. See JUVENILE JUSTICE ACCOUNTABILITY BD., supra note 15, at 46-47.
24. See TASK FORCE FOR THE REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS
SYSTEMS, FINAL REPORT 65 (1995) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].

25. See id. at 66.
26. See id. at 65.
27. See JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY BD., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
FACT BOOK 16 (Draft Jan. 19, 1996).
28. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 66-67.
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2, 4, 6, 8, and 10.29 The Level 2 programs were all nonresidential
placements, whereas the Level 10 programs were scaled back correctional
facilities designed to hold serious delinquents for up to three years.3 °
The 1994 changes were far more than legislative slight of hand. In the
past, the primary focus of the juvenile justice system had been the
rehabilitative needs of the child. In 1994, the paramount concern of juvenile
justice became public safety. Many groups that supported the transfer of
juvenile responsibilities to the new DJJ, including prosecutors and law
enforcement, were not as concerned about past bureaucratic shortcomings as
they were about assuring the public that the juvenile crime problem was no
longer going to be left to social workers.
More recently, the legislature has increased the number of juvenile
defendants that are transferable to adult court and authorized secure
"consequence units" for youths taken into custody for alleged violations of
community control or aftercare. Monies also have been allocated to place
those youths with an "established pattern of significant disruptive behavior"
and those who are chronic runaways in staff-secure shelters.32 A pilot
project to place juvenile contemnors in secure custody was implemented.33
Florida, like much of America, has arrived full circle in dealing with
juveniles. An era of reform and rehabilitation has been rejected and has been
replaced by "get tough" and "tough love." Not surprisingly, a former police
chief from urbanized South Florida was appointed as the initial director of
DJJ.

34

There have been some limited signs of success with Florida's
increasingly punitive approach. From 1996 through 1998, a 9% reduction in
juvenile crime was reported.3 5 However, as some of that reduction might
have been demographically predicted, a question remains as to whether this
reduction was entirely attributable to the state's new commitment-centered
philosophy. Critics point out that any agency, including the discredited and
renamed HRS (now Department of Children and Families), would likely
show a modicum of success with the massive infusion of money that DJJ had
received. Others point out that funding for prevention has been severely
neglected. Nothing, according to those critics, suggests that the state will
deter future juvenile criminals simply by warehousing current chronic

29. See HOUSE JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 54-55.
30. See id.
31. See FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)1.c (1997); 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-55.
32. See FLA. STAT. § 984.225(1)(a)-(b) (1997); 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-280.
33. See FLA. STAT. § 984.226; 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-280.
34. See FLORIDA DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 1996-97, at 5 (1997).
In 1994, former Miami Police Chief Calvin Ross was named by Governor Chiles as the first
Secretary of the DJJ. See id.
35. See FLORIDA DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 1997-98, at 11 (1998).
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offenders or changing the name of juvenile residential facilities to "juvenile
prisons." Those critics are right!
Florida's current approach has favorably impacted juvenile crime rates,
but alone it will not significantly deter future juvenile or adult offenders.
Even after factoring in the impact of increased commitments, juvenile crime
rates are, and will remain, at unacceptable levels, especially considering the
"Hawthorne effect" 36 operating in relation to a newly created agency. The
current approach is replete with programmatic disappointments. For example,
juvenile boot camps were the "idea de jour" in 1996 and 1997. The public
and law enforcement embraced the idea of a paramilitary camp designed to
scare advanced juvenile delinquents away from crime. Despite extensive
contraindicative studies from other jurisdictions,37 Florida encouraged and
funded boot camp construction. The results have been disappointing though
predictable. While a limited number of boot camps have been successful,
such as those in Martin or Polk counties, they are programs where
boot camp
38
is used as a component of an overall rehabilitative strategy.
The most encouraging news about boot camps has been the academic
improvement achieved during the step-down phases. 39 This suggests that
exposing front-end offenders to a short-term boot camp experience, followed
by effective academic step-down is the best utilization of boot camps.
Recidivism rates for boot camps without effective step-down and/or aftercare
have been reported to be as high as 71%, and rearrest within one year of
release was often for crimes more serious than the original offense. 4° The
mystery lies in why it was thought that simply placing a 16- or 17-year-old
delinquent in a boot camp for four months would alter a lifetime of criminal
behavior, especially when the boot camp graduate was then released to the
same mean streets where the juvenile had learned to be a criminal. The only

36. See FRrrz JULES ROETHLISBERGER & WILLIAM JOHN DICKSON, MANAGEMENT AND
THE WORKER (1939) (discussing the Hawthorne Effect, which derived its name from a study
by Western Electric at its Hawthorne plant and observed that agencies and companies perform
better when involved in a study).
37. See PENAL AFFAIRS CONSORTIUM, "BOOT CAMPS" FOR YOUNG OFFENDERS (visited
Mar. 26, 1997) <http://www.penlex.org.uk/pacboot.html> (restricted web site) (on file with
author).
38. See FLORIDA DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT REPORT No. 63, supra note
17, at 84 (based on actual Juvenile Justice Advisory Board site visits as well as visits to the
Palm Beach Eagle Academy).
39. See Word Still Out on Juvenile Boot Camps, GAINESVILLE SUN, Jan. 11, 1996, at IB;
see also FLORIDA DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT REPORT No. 55, POLK COUNTY
JUVENILE BOOT CAMP-FEMALE PROGRAM: A FOLLOW-UP STUDY OF THE FIRST SEVEN

PLATOONS 23 (1997) (providing an example of the step-down program's academic
achievement).
40. See RES. DIG., ISSUE No. 13, JAN. 1998, Overview of the Department of Juvenile
Justice Recidivism Reportfor Commitment Programs,FY 1995-96 (Florida Dep't of Juv. Just.
Executive Serv., 1998).
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thing a boot camp experience did was to make older juveniles a little smarter,
faster, and stronger the next time the police had to catch them.
The reason juvenile justice is too often behind the crime rate curve is that
it is entirely reactive when it should be proactive. Worse yet, in taking this
reactive approach Florida has implemented and maintained too many outdated
and unsuccessful programs. At a recent national crime conference held at the
University of Colorado, the focus of the meeting was "10 programs that don't
work and 10 programs that do." 41 Of the programs identified by experts as
"not working," several are extensively relied upon in Florida. Although
many types of boot camps and wilderness challenge programs have been
demonstrably unsuccessful in curtailing recidivism, 42 Florida continues to
invest in both. Even though waivers to criminal court have proven to have
little effect in diminishing juvenile crime, 43 recently proposed legislation
would require prosecutors to mandatorily waive more juveniles to the adult
system and eliminate the court's ability to consider juvenile sanctions for
such offenders. 44 Even programs that have consistently performed below
DJJ expectations have received continued funding.45
The greatest impediment to success in the juvenile area is inherent in the
way the current juvenile justice system is structured. The only way a
juvenile is committed to a DJJ program is as a result of one or more, usually
several, serious acts of delinquency. When the youth goes to court, the
juvenile judge must operate in light of the due process rights guaranteed to
every juvenile defendant. In most cases, a public defender, whose oath of
advocacy necessarily requires him or her to focus on defending the youth
against the pending criminal charges, is appointed. The juvenile prosecutor's
primary concern, in a system that too often measures success by the rapid
movement of case files and by conviction rates, is attaining a successful
disposition of the case. "Successful" means that the case closed rapidly in
some manner that allowed the juvenile prosecutor to report a conviction.
The first concern of the juvenile judge, with some admirable exceptions,
is with docket control and procedural compliance. If there is a trial, it is a
bench trial. This system is troubling to juvenile advocates who see the youth
as being exposed to a greater likelihood of incarceration than their adult

41. See generally Center for the Study of the Prevention of Violence, Univ. of Colorado,
CSPV Position Summary & Fact Sheets (1998) (on file with author).
42. See FLORIDA DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT REPORT No. 63, supra note

17, at 56-57.
43. See FLORIDA DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT REPORT NO. 64 supra note
3, at 31 (indicating that the overall percentage of juveniles transferred to adult court is
minimal and consequently could be of small effect on statewide juvenile crime rates).
44. See Fla. H.B. 4193 (1998); Fla. H.B. 205 (1998).
45. See generally STAFF OF THE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE COST
EFFECTIVENESS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMITMENT PROGRAMS, REP. No. 97-P-22 (1997).
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counterparts without the protection of a jury trial. Those same advocates for
juveniles argue compellingly that the juvenile's rights are severely diminished
since a bench trial conviction can be considered later, if and when the
juvenile becomes an adult offender. If a youth is found delinquent, the court
is then faced with a commitment assessment instrument that too often is
given only slight weight once the court learns that there is no opening at the
appropriate commitment level. The prosecutor and the judge, faced with the
unacceptable prospect of placing the youth on a waiting list, readily opt for
commitment to any available program. It is of little surprise that a youth in
need of a Level 8 or Level 10 placement both disrupts and recidivates after
being committed to a Level 6 program.
There is an inherent problem with a judicial system so adversarial that
it does not simultaneously consider the best interests of the child and the
public safety issues. Assume for a moment that a 13-year-old is charged
with possession of narcotics. Assume further that the basis for the arrest
turns out to be an unconstitutional search or that the evidence does not
support a finding of constructive possession because other family members,
including the parents, share the area from which the drugs were seized. The
prosecutor will most likely have to dismiss the charges. The public defender,
if a case is filed, will move to suppress the evidence or for dismissal of the
charges. The judge, if the evidence supports it, must grant either suppression
or dismissal.
As a result of the foregoing, the youth has been afforded ample due
process but only a simulacrum of justice. The technicalities of the law have
been satisfied, but the real needs of the child remain unaddressed. The child
will be released with everyone in the courtroom realizing that he or she is
going back to a home where drugs are being used and to a parent or parents
who are negligent or even complicit. The current system is willing to neglect
the child's needs and to even permit the child's return to certain jeopardy
because, contrary to a widely held myth, home and family are too often the
most dangerous place for a child.
Let me suggest a very different model for our juvenile justice system,
one that recognizes that the best interests of the child and public safety are
not incompatible. It is a model that the Florida legislature first considered
years ago, 46 one that is already being piloted to some degree in certain parts
of the state.47 First, in every case when a petition for delinquency is filed,
the child should have a guardian ad litem appointed to make recommendations to the court as to the best interests of the child. The appointment
46. See FLA. STAT. § 984.226 (1998); 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-280.
47. The Eighth Judicial Circuit now provides Children's Legal Services for District 3 of
the Department of Children and Families. This includes all petitions for termination and
dependency.
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must operate beyond the pending criminal issues. Procedurally, the same
court would sequentially consider delinquency, ungovernability, and
dependency. For instance, even if the evidence did not support a finding of
delinquency, the court would be empowered to immediately consider
alternatives beyond releasing the child back to questionable circumstances.
A consolidated juvenile court system would first focus on public safety
issues. Then, in appropriate cases, the judge would proceed to consider any
additional needs the child may have.
A court model requiring an expansive, even conciliatory approach to
delinquency cases would increase the resources and options available in every
case. Juvenile prosecutors, in addition to petitioning for delinquency, could
file "Children in Need of Services" (CINS-FINS) petitions for ungovernable
children, or dependency petitions, or counts - something prosecutors in this
state did in the recent past.48 The same court considering a delinquency
charge would be fully apprised of truancy issues. Juvenile judges would
have expanded jurisdiction and placement options. The number of separate
findings dealing with the same juvenile would be reduced as would the costs
to the state for expert witnesses and evaluations. The child would be
subjected to expanded supervision with greater oversight and aftercare
options. Fewer youths would walk out of juvenile court with the feeling they
had beaten the system; fewer parents would shake their heads in disbelief
because the ungovernable behavior of their child had just been reinforced;
fewer victims would feel frustrated that nothing had happened; and fewer
law-enforcement officials would feel anger at a system that neither punished
nor helped a youth headed toward trouble.
The cross-utilization of facilities and programs between DJJ, the
Department of Children and Families, the Department of Health, and the
local school authorities would better enable each to deal with troubled youth.
A more collaborative, less adversarial approach would assume that every
aspect of a child's behavior and background should be considered by the
court. The juvenile court's focus could then be more corrective than
punitive, more substance than form. The effectiveness of punishment by a
system that was able to meaningfully intervene and redirect a child headed
for trouble would be enhanced. The mantra of the juvenile system would
change from "I did all I could do" to "we did what needed to be done!"
Over 130 years ago Abraham Lincoln made a statement that ought to be the
approach Florida takes to creating a more utilitarian juvenile justice system:
"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The
occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion.

48. See 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-170.
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As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew." 49
After all, all that is at stake is the safety and success of future
generations of Floridians.

49. Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 1, 1862, in THE
LINCOLN ENCYCLOPEDIA (Archer H. Shaw ed., 1950).
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